The question under discussion is whether Texas received any Grade-A talents in the Tex trade, not whether they got lots of good players in the Tex trade, or whether their package was (on the whole) worth more than ours. I would certainly hope for their sake that their package was more valuable, insofar as Tex was both a better hitter and a better fielder than Bay, not to mention younger and healthier.

The question of my first statement is the question under discussion because JRoth in his post advanced the theory that our philosophical methodology in approaching the trade was flawed, in that we were “depending on a non-blue chip A pitcher becoming a valuable piece”. I wasn’t “missing” any of your points – I was ignoring them, insofar as they are a series of irrelevant non sequiturs within the context of this particular discussion. You are advocating an approach that’s entirely 180 degrees from the one that he’s advocating – he wanted us to hold onto Bay unless we got multiple Grade A talents for him, while you would prefer a return that consisted entirely of Byian Morris types (i.e. toolsy, projectable prospects several years from the majors) to the exclusion of Grade A talents. Which is fine, but an entirely separate matter for analysis and discussion.

1) What leads you to believe that Feliz was a top 125 prospect? Yes, he was justly lauded for his fastball, but he was left entirely out of BA’s Braves top 10 that season. As such, he was at a minimum behind seven other people in his own organization, competing for one of 25 slots. And that wasn’t a particularly strong year for Atlanta’s farm system…

2) Casey Blake brought back more in trade than one would expect because the Indians picked up Blake’s entire salary in order to make the deal happen. Their willingness to do so is what allowed them to put Santana in the deal – without it, they would’ve only gotten Meloan.

3) If you honestly think that Chris Perez and Jess Todd are more valuable than our Bay package was at the time of the deal, then I really don’t know how to respond to that. I’d certainly be interested in seeing you try to make that case…

4) There’s something amusing about an argument that defines LaRoche as a player whose value was falling, based on a drop from #19 to #31 in BA’s rankings, while simultaneously ignoring a drop from #18 to #36 in those same rankings by the highest-ranked player in the Tex package (i.e. Saltalamacchia). Or one that criticizes the Pirates for focusing too much on ML-ready talent instead of lower minors players, while simultaneously lauding the Rangers for the Tex trade, insofar as Saltalamacchia (i.e. the centerpiece of the deal) was already up and playing semi-regularly in the majors when the trade was made.

…is entirely relevant if we’re trying to assess whether he was regarded as as good a prospect as anyone in the Tex deal at the time it was made. Indeed, that’s pretty much the ONLY relevant criterion when you’re trying to answer that particular question. Since LaRoche was regarded as a better prospect than anyone in the Tex deal, either he was a Grade A prospect, or none of the guys in the Tex deal were. Which is it?

In LaRoche’s first full season as a starter, he ranked 14th among ML 3B in WAR, tied with Chipper Jones and one tenth of one point behind Kevin Kouzmanoff. He’s already an average player. He doesn’t need to turn anything around to get there – he already did it. He’s already there.

LaRoche didn’t start the year at AAA because he’d already destroyed it twice. He had nothing left to learn there. He just needed good health and a clean shot at a job, which he got, and used to establish himself as an average regular (with some remaining upside, given his age).