The DH and strategy

by bucdaddy on Jun 17, 2011 10:42 AM EDT

Vlad and I got into a debate the other day about the DH.

I said I could live with the DH in the National League in returning for balancing the number of teams in each division. Vlad takes the "death before DH" stance, and I admit I once held that attitude myself. His argument is that the DH reduces the strat-ee-gery involved in the game. When do you bunt? When do you pinch hit? When do you change pitchers?

I contended that much of what we think of as strategy is really not strategy at all. If your pitcher comes up in the fifth inning of a 2-1 game and there's one out and a runner on first, the pitcher bunts, or tries to. This is pretty much automatic 99.9 percent of the time, and to me there's no strategy involved in automatic decisions. To me, strategy is an argument. If you and a friend are at a game and you say, "I'd hit for this guy with player X," and your friend says, "You're crazy, let him stay in and bat," well, NOW you're talking strategy.

Anyway, I decided to see what the numbers say to determine if there's more strategy in the NL than the AL. What would we consider to be strategic points quantifiable by numbers?

One might be the sacrifice bunt, for which information is available in bb-ref.

Another might be the intentional walk, ditto.

(A third might be the number of pinch hitters used, but oddly I didn't see a breakdown for that on bb-ref. If anyone knows of a location for the information -- number of pinch hitters used by league, especially if it has the numbers broken down by batting order position -- please steer me there. Similarly, there may well be a breakdown there somewhere for sac hits by batting position for each league, but I couldn't find that either.)

So let's say that strategy is a form of argument between opposing managers. One would bunt in situation X, the other wouldn't. Now obviously, there's a big difference in the raw number of sac hits between the leagues. In 2010 NL batters recorded 1006 and AL batters recorded 538. So on the surface it looks like there's twice as much bunt strat-ee-gery going on in the NL, and that Vlad is right.

However, I'm going to go way out on a limb and in the absence of stats suppose the difference is almost entirely attributable to pitchers sacrificing, which to me is not a strategic move at all, not if everyone would bunt in the same situation.

And it's not like there's NO strategy at all in the AL. It's not like the sac bunt has disappeared entirely. And you could make the case (and I'll try) that in the AL there's a wider range of argument over when to bunt.

In the NL in 2010, the team that sacrificed the fewest number of times had 35 and the team with the most had 85. That's a ratio of about 2.5:1. In the AL, the range was 16 to 53, closer to 3.5:1. I know there are some other factors in all this, but for the most part, in 2010, the argument about whether the bunt is a good strategy was more pronounced in the AL.

In 2009, there were 1,138 sacs in the NL, 497 in the AL. The NL range was 54-100, less than 2:1. The AL range was 13-53, or better than 4:1.

In 2008, there were 1,049 sacs in the NL (49-90, again less than 2:1). In the AL there were 477 (23-52, or better than 2:1).

There appears to be more of an argument going on in the AL about sac bunting philosophies, hence more strategy. And don't forget, there are much less quantifiable strategic decisions that go on when your ninth batter is a real hitter versus a pitcher. You have hit and run options you don't have with a pitcher. You have stolen base options.

Yeah, you have pinch hitting options too, and I'd guess if I found the numbers I'd see that the NL uses a lot more pinch hitters than the AL. This only makes sense, but again, is it really strat-ee-gery to hit for your pitcher in the sixth inning when you're behind 3-1? I'd argue no, because 99 percent of managers would. In the AL, if you're behind 3-1 in the sixth and your No. 9 hitter comes up, you really have a decision to make, not least because you'd also have to replace the guy in the field. (You also have a tougher decision to make there about when to remove your starter, since the decision is not forced on you by the starter coming up to bat. It's up to you to decide when he's finished.) Anyway, I'm just supposing here without any numbers to look at.

One other stat I thought I'd look at was intentional walks. Now you might suppose there would be more IBBs in the NL than the AL, and you would be right (part of that is because there are more teams in the NL, of course, but never mind that for now). Without the batting order position IBB numbers to crunch, I'd suppose that's partly because you might be most inclined to walk the No. 8 hitter to GET to the pitcher and thus force the type of move we discussed above. But that's often a no-brainer too. In the AL, if you choose to walk a batter, it's to get to another real hitter, and then you open your strategic decision to the possibility of greater criticism. Almost nobody is going to be upset with you if you walk a guy to pitch to a pitcher.

Anyway, in 2010 NL pitchers issued 759 IBBs (27-78, just under 3:1) and AL pitchers issued 457 (16-50, just over 3:1).

In 2009, NL pitchers issued 770 IBBs (37-76, just over 2:1) and AL pitchers 409 (16-39, about 2.5:1).

In 2008, NL pitchers issued 780 IBBs -- that number is remarkably consistent, isn't it? -- (21-71, or about 3.5:1), and AL pitchers issued 530 (23-49, or just over 2:1).

So we have kind of a split decision here. Managers in the two leagues seem to come down to about the same range on the IBB. The argument is a narrower one.

One other point I'll try to make though, and let's be honest: Unless you're watching a clown car infield defense where every bunt is an adventure, I'd argue that the sac bunt and the IBB are among the dullest plays in the sport, just from an aesthetic standpoint.

Also, with the former you're giving up an out to move a runner 90 feet, and I believe the tables say that in general this DECREASES your chances of scoring (though the fact that out is a pitcher who likely would have been an out anyway kind of mitigates that a little). So there's twice as much bunting going on in the NL, and it's probably decreasing the likelihood of scoring, and this is a point in FAVOR of strategy?

There's more intentional walking going on in the NL, adding a baserunner for the opponent, generally increasing the possibility of your opponent scoring, and this is a point in FAVOR of strategy?

FWIW, I have a hardback copy of the original Bill James Historical Abstract, and on page 260 is an article titled "1973: DH rule increases strategy," in which he made pretty much the same arguments I just did. Disagree with me all you want, but it likely means you're disagreeing with James too.

This is a FanPost and does not necessarily reflect the views of the managing editor (Charlie) or SB Nation. FanPosts are written by Bucs Dugout readers.

Tweet Comment 48 comments | 2 recs |

Do you like this story?

Comments

I hate to disagree with the smartest baseball man..........but

I am almost positive that Hurdle has pinch hitted for jeff karsten in the sixth or seventh inning, even though they are winning or he has only thrown 70-80 pitches.

So, is leaving a guy like Karstens in without you knowing his limit really a move 99% of managers should make?

by evenmeek2 on Jun 17, 2011 11:02 AM EDT reply actions

That suggests they don't know his limit.

If they DO know his limit and it’s 70-80 pitches, and if it’s reasonable to believe any other team that had him could figure out what his limit is too, and if they all had a bullpen as solid as ours, then yeah, I’d say they’d hit for him 99% of the time.

by bucdaddy on Jun 17, 2011 11:28 AM EDT up reply actions

Pitchers batting leads to strategy in a number of ways beyond bunting

How is the opposing team’s bullpen? How is their reliever warming up handed? Who’s hot on your bench? Who hits lefties/righties best? Do you pinch-hit your hottest hitter or the best hitter against lefties/righties? How deep is the opposing team’s infield? Do you bring up a hitter to face one pitcher and sacrifice depth later in the game? Do you pinch hit with a man on first and two outs in the bottom of the ninth when the game is tied, or have your pitcher bat so he can go another inning? All sorts of questions and scenarios to consider that don’t exist in the American league.

And you have to admit, there’s no feeling in baseball as good as seeing your pitcher get a hit.

by rennais94 on Jun 17, 2011 11:23 AM EDT reply actions

I wouldn't know

Not actually affiliated with whygavs.

by WHYG Zane Smith on Jun 17, 2011 11:23 AM EDT up reply actions

Hah!

Good one.

by bucdaddy on Jun 17, 2011 11:29 AM EDT up reply actions

(as seen here)

Seriously, I’m against the DH. I agree that IBBs are boring, but I’m not sure about this argument (as did the OP): “There’s more intentional walking going on in the NL, adding a baserunner for the opponent, generally increasing the possibility of your opponent scoring.”

In general the IBB will let the opponents score more runs — but is this true when you’re trying to get to the pitcher? The analyses of the IBB online that I’ve seen seem to concentrate on the AL, because they acknowledge that walking the 8 hitter to get to the pitcher is a different situation.

Not actually affiliated with whygavs.

by WHYG Zane Smith on Jun 17, 2011 11:31 AM EDT up reply actions

I don't know.

I admit there’s not enough information (or if there is I don’t have the time to try to track it down and make sense of it) on that issue to make a claim one way or the other. In any case, if the situation is leveraged enough, you’ll likely be looking at a pinch hitter anyway. That does set off a cascade of what would appear on the surface to be strategic choices, but again a lot of them are more or less predetermined. If the pitcher issuing the IBB to get to the pitcher is RH, then the pinch hitter is almost certainly going to be LH, which means it’s going to be one of maybe two guys. That kind of thing. With most teams carrying 12 pitchers, everyone’s bench is four hitters (three if you’re the Pirates — I’m looking at you, Ciriaco) and the backup catcher. It’s not like there’s an overwhelming number of options there. RH vs. LH considerations will drive most of what happens.

Let me put it this way: How many “strategic” moves in the average game actually surprise you, come completely out of nowhere? “Whoa, I didn’t see THAT coming! That manager must be some kind of evil genius!” OK, so that’s LaRussa. But really, how often are you shocked, SHOCKED! to see someone called off the bench or out of the bullpen completely counter to the accumulated wisdom of 150 years of baseball stra-tee-gery? If the manager’s moves agree with the smart baseball fan’s moves 98 percent of the time, where’s the strategy in that? Real strategy is in trying to find the edge nobody else sees, not in doing what almost everybody else would do in the same situation, IMHO, and there’s very little of that. And when somebody tries something truly unorthodox — the no-triples defense, the pitcher batting eighth — it usually gets a) ripped to shreds in the blogosphere and b) rapidly abandoned because it doesn’t work.

by bucdaddy on Jun 17, 2011 11:50 AM EDT up reply actions

First of all, Bucdaddy, really nice write-up here. Even though I mostly disagree with you, the whole thing is very well-written and logical. Nice work.

That being said, I’m gonna pick some nits. First of all, I disagree that:

Real strategy is in trying to find the edge nobody else sees, not in doing what almost everybody else would do in the same situation, IMHO, and there’s very little of that.

If that’s your definition, then there’s essentially zero “strategy” in any major sport, because at this point I think that just about every tactic has probably been tried a few times.

Really, you’re talking about trickery, which yes, is rare and typically doesn’t work.

I’d say that “strategy” is simply any decision which the manager feels gives their team an edge over the opponent. Playing Garrett Jones over Xavier Paul because you feel his bat is worth more than the defensive gain is a strategic decision. Playing Xavier Paul over Garrett Jones because you feel his defense is worth more than the offensive loss is also a strategic decision.

~ ~ ~

My single biggest issue with the DH is just that it destroys the risk/reward gamble of how long to leave your pitcher in. Maybe we’re getting spoiled because the Bucs’ pen has been so solid this year, but often you’re looking at a decent drop-off in ability going from your starter to your 7th inning guys.

Sure, some decisions are clear-cut, but a lot aren’t. 3-3 game in the bottom of the 6th, man on second, two outs. Maholm up. Pitch count at 85. Situations like that really force managers to weigh the risk of depending on the bullpen versus the potential reward of scoring.

by Garrett122 on Jun 17, 2011 1:12 PM EDT up reply actions

You make a good point

and I have perhaps overstated my position on what “strategy” means. Really, your definition seems a little truer. Lineup construction and all that, yes, I see the strategy involved there.

I’d argue that the tradeoff with the DH is that your decision on when to change pitchers isn’t so much dictated by game situations that have nothing to do with pitching. In your scenario, with the DH you’re not forced to hit for Maholm at that point, but you DO have to be aware of the pitch count and his limitations and decide when to take him out of the game on HIS merits, not because your hand is forced. In other words, there’s strategy involved both ways, just different strategy.

by bucdaddy on Jun 17, 2011 2:42 PM EDT up reply actions

that's a valid point

In terms of just evaluating and rewarding performance, it definitely makes sense to be able to make those decisions based strictly on the pitcher’s performance.

I guess in terms of entertainment value, though, I enjoy that handicap, and the dilemma it puts managers in.

Another situation that’s similar but not identical is when you have your starter on the hill, in a minor jam, but also due to lead off next inning. Let’s say, hypothetically, Bucs up 5-4 in the top of the sixth, Maholm on the hill again. 2 outs, men on first and second. Maholm’s gassed, BUT he’s also up first next inning.

So do you bring in Watson/Moskos/Resop to get that last out, knowing that you’re going to either pinch-hit for them immediately, or be forced to lead off with a reliever next inning? Or do you take your chances with Maholm to get the last out, so you can pinch hit for him and not waste a reliever?

~ ~ ~

Honestly, the more words I write about this, it occurs to me that’s it’s basically just a question of aesthetics, and how we as fans view the difficulties and challenges that teams and managers have to deal with.

If you view those difficulties as an entertaining part of the game (as I do), then the DH is just watering down a good thing. If you view those difficulties as distracting from the meat-and-potatoes of the game (which is a perfectly defensible position), then the DH increases the entertainment factor.

by Garrett122 on Jun 17, 2011 3:05 PM EDT up reply actions 3 recs

I agree with this.

bucdaddy’s argument is as strong as I’ve seen, just not strong enough. No thanks to the DH.

by MDBuc on Jun 17, 2011 3:27 PM EDT up reply actions

So do you bring in Watson/Moskos/Resop to get that last out, knowing that you’re going to either pinch-hit for them immediately, or be forced to lead off with a reliever next inning? Or do you take your chances with Maholm to get the last out, so you can pinch hit for him and not waste a reliever?

If you’re Clint, you double-switch. But then you are replacing a starter with a sub who is presumably not as good (or he would have been starting), so there’s yet another layer of calculation involved.

by DG Lewis on Jun 17, 2011 4:06 PM EDT up reply actions

Clint's double switches

often involve a defensive upgrade, IMO

by Central*Scrutinizer on Jun 18, 2011 3:39 AM EDT up reply actions

and that's really just the half

of it. I hope this comes into factor in the O’s and Sox series. We really need to make Boston’s 56789 beat us and work around the others as much as possible.

by bucsreport on Jun 17, 2011 11:54 AM EDT up reply actions

I Disagree with James

I guess then I am disagreeing with God ‘cause I hate the DH and don’t want the NL to adopt it.

If you have ever played a computer version of a baseball game (and I have written 3 versions) and had to decide when to pinchit, bring in a relief pitcher, swap fielders, pinch runners, etc. then you know how complex it is. It makes the game much more interesting to watch and play.

The DH allows the manager to pinch hit less and swap pitchers with no impact on his lineup. The 2 for 1 swap does not exist in the AL. Basically in the AL the bench players don’t get into the game as much as in the NL. So the AL places emphasis on having the best starting 8 instead of the best 13 position players.

How many NL games end up with the bench playing a key role in winning a game? In the AL they don’t.

So sorry, James is wrong.

by zogger on Jun 17, 2011 12:50 PM EDT reply actions

Players Union is going to push for DH league wide.

It guarantees more players more jobs, Helps old players stay longer in the league and make more money.

by BigB2323 on Jun 17, 2011 1:00 PM EDT reply actions

There are the same amount of jobs, and I don’t see any evidence that it increases the overall salary of the American League teams.

by MarkInDallas on Jun 17, 2011 1:11 PM EDT up reply actions

I think what BigB meant is

“More job opportunities for older players.” This is pretty indisputable, I think. Jim Thome says hey.

by Garrett122 on Jun 17, 2011 1:13 PM EDT up reply actions

as does big puppy

by lambert58 on Jun 17, 2011 2:51 PM EDT up reply actions

HEY GUYS ITS JI

by titanlord91 on Jun 17, 2011 3:17 PM EDT up reply actions

JIM THOME

the dugout reference, anyone?

by titanlord91 on Jun 17, 2011 3:18 PM EDT up reply actions

honestly though

yeah, the DH will never be eliminated since the players union wont allow it. I hate the DH but I think there will come a day when its adopted league-wide unfortunately.

by titanlord91 on Jun 17, 2011 3:20 PM EDT up reply actions

yes yes yes

thank you for this, lg

by Garrett122 on Jun 17, 2011 6:24 PM EDT up reply actions

More jobs for a specific skill set, though.

You think David Ortiz would make as much as he does as is if he had to take the field every day?

www.stealingfirstbase.com

by Stealing First Base on Jun 17, 2011 2:59 PM EDT up reply actions

Everyoone on defense should

also play offense; if you substitute an offense hitter for the pitcher, why not do it for the whole time and have an offense and a defense as football does.

Tom Specht

by weltytowngang on Jun 17, 2011 1:53 PM EDT reply actions

Couldn’t they just allow 26 man rosters for interleague games.

Put on your dancin' shoes.

by PensFan024 on Jun 17, 2011 1:53 PM EDT reply actions

sale the DH

why give the american league such a big advandage in w/s and inter league.

57-105 come on "sale the team"

by sweetleb on Jun 17, 2011 2:22 PM EDT reply actions

Pitcher Bunting

Sorry the post is too long. I have ADD on Friday afternoon.

So I’m going to pick on your pitcher bunts in the 5th inning argument which you brought up early in the post. Of course he’ll bunt if it’s the 5th in a 2-1 game unless it’s Zach Duke (chortle). But what if it’s the 7th? What is the starter’s pitch count? Your argument approaches straw man status, because you left out several important factors.

by lambert58 on Jun 17, 2011 2:45 PM EDT reply actions

Interesting post.

As a die-hard hater of the DH, I enjoyed reading a counter-argument showing the strategy involved in a game with a DH. Rec’d.

I actually argued about this during the WBC in favor of the pitch count rule. I said that it was a way for the game to stay strategic while also having a DH.

I’d be bummed if baseball went to a DH in both leagues. But at the same time, I don’t think it’s the worst thing that can happen to the game.

Also on a more meta note: every time somebody brings up something like this I’m reminded of the old “difference between strategy and tactics” conversation. Pinch hitting, for example, isn’t strategy. It’s a tactic designed to help you achieve your overarching strategy.

www.stealingfirstbase.com

by Stealing First Base on Jun 17, 2011 3:02 PM EDT reply actions

"difference between strategy and tactics"

Good point. Recently went through another painful strategic planning process, so I have no excuse. Wait, I didn’t mention strategy or tactics in my post—never mind. DOH!

by lambert58 on Jun 17, 2011 3:13 PM EDT up reply actions

Maybe you didn't, but the OP did.

Notice that I wasn’t replying to you.

www.stealingfirstbase.com

by Stealing First Base on Jun 17, 2011 3:57 PM EDT up reply actions

"Notice that I wasn’t replying to you"

Yeah, I got that. Was just trying to show some support after threatening to blow you off your bicycle yesterday. Stay classy Muncie.

by lambert58 on Jun 17, 2011 4:36 PM EDT up reply actions

Sorry, it read as sarcastic.

www.stealingfirstbase.com

by Stealing First Base on Jun 17, 2011 11:28 PM EDT up reply actions

Vlad takes the “death before DH” stance, and I admit I once held that attitude myself. His argument is that the DH reduces the strat-ee-gery involved in the game.

That’s not really an accurate summation of my position. I think that the DH does reduce strategy, but that’s a secondary outgrowth from my primary objection, which is that it distorts the fundamental run-scoring/run-prevention balance of the game’s structure and creates incentives that benefit flawed players and penalize more well-rounded ones. See this comment for more detail.

by Vlad on Jun 17, 2011 3:27 PM EDT reply actions

My bad.

I confused your secondary objection with your primary objection. I stand corrected.

by bucdaddy on Jun 18, 2011 11:38 AM EDT up reply actions

It's all good.

If you couldn’t understand what I was trying to say, that’s my fault, not yours. I should have taken more time and written it more clearly.

by Vlad on Jun 18, 2011 7:55 PM EDT up reply actions

You're gracious, but that's not necessarily true.

Sometimes I just have a thick skull, or I get lost in my own head.

It’ll happen to all of you, eventually, by cracky, if God lets you live long enough.

by bucdaddy on Jun 19, 2011 11:00 AM EDT up reply actions

~~Sometimes~~ I just have a thick skull, ~~or I get lost in my own head~~.

FTFY
;-)

Free your ass and your mind will follow.

by cocktailsfor2 on Jun 19, 2011 1:04 PM EDT up reply actions

I also think that any analytical system that tries to measure “strategy” purely in terms of quantities of first-order outcomes like “pinch hitters used” or “sac bunts attempted” is fatally flawed on an inherent level.

For example, in the post Bucdaddy said,

…is it really strat-ee-gery to hit for your pitcher in the sixth inning when you’re behind 3-1? I’d argue no, because 99 percent of managers would.

Looking at the strategy for that situation as a binary (hit for the pitcher/do not hit for the pitcher) decision is a gross oversimplification of the actual decision tree involved. For instance, the manager could hit for the pitcher with any one of five bench players. He could also then elect to leave any of those five players in the game at the end of the inning, as a part of a double switch. Thus, the total range of plausible outcomes from the decision in question is not two, as he would have it, but at least eleven (leave the pitcher in/PH with any of the five bench players and then remove the PH/PH with any of the five bench players and leave that PH in the game while removing another player). The tree expands even further in cases where one or more of the PH options can play more than one position, or cases where the other team’s manager reacts to your move by replacing his pitcher with a reliever who throws from the same side from which your pinch hitter bats.

By forcing all of these different options with very different downstream consequences into one messy gestalt (i.e. the “decision to pinch hit for the pitcher”), Bucdaddy is effectively destroying the very strategic richness he says that he is attempting to analyze.

by Vlad on Jun 17, 2011 3:46 PM EDT reply actions 2 recs

For example, consider the situation above within the specific context of the Pirates. Up until Doumit’s injury, he was BY FAR the most effective hitter on our bench in games when he wasn’t starting. Down two runs with a man on base and two out in the sixth inning is a fairly high leverage situation in which the decision to use him as a PH would provide a substantial benefit, particularly against a RHP, and with only three innings remaining we might not get a better chance to deploy him in a later-game situation. However, since he was the team’s only backup catcher, we would have to leave him in the game at 1B or in the OF (both positions at which he’d be a defensive downgrade on the player currently in the game) or run the risk of Snyder being injured and Diaz finishing the game as an emergency catcher. Would it make more sense to downgrade our chances of putting together a big inning right now by using a lesser PH like Wood, while saving Doumit for a different high-leverage situation later on that may never come? And if there’s a chance the opposing manager may pull his starter in response, how does that affect the calculation, given that Doumit’s reasonably competent from both sides of the plate?

by Vlad on Jun 17, 2011 3:59 PM EDT up reply actions

Very nicely stated

by WestCoastBuc on Jun 17, 2011 6:28 PM EDT up reply actions

Thank you.

This puts into words what I intuitively felt about the strategies involved but never took the time to analyze.

by MDBuc on Jun 17, 2011 4:31 PM EDT up reply actions

Also, with the former you’re giving up an out to move a runner 90 feet, and I believe the tables say that in general this DECREASES your chances of scoring (though the fact that out is a pitcher who likely would have been an out anyway kind of mitigates that a little). So there’s twice as much bunting going on in the NL, and it’s probably decreasing the likelihood of scoring, and this is a point in FAVOR of strategy?

In the modern offensive context, sac bunting generally decreases average run output for the inning in which the bunt occurs… IF you assume a league-average hitter, which a pitcher deploying a sac bunt obviously isn’t. Similarly, depending on the position of the runners and the game situation, a sac bunt with even a league-average hitter DOES sometimes result in a greater chance of scoring one run, which is the optimal goal on which to focus in certain game situations.

FWIW, I have a hardback copy of the original Bill James Historical Abstract, and on page 260 is an article titled “1973: DH rule increases strategy,” in which he made pretty much the same arguments I just did. Disagree with me all you want, but it likely means you’re disagreeing with James too.

I’m fine with that. James is generally a smart guy, but he’s gotten lots of stuff wrong over the years, for all kinds of reasons. Look at his position on Rose’s ban from baseball in The Politics of Glory, for example, or the lack of park/league adjustment in Sim Scores, or the issue of negative Win Shares.

by Vlad on Jun 17, 2011 4:04 PM EDT reply actions

I think bucdaddy has it right

But Vlad’s never wrong. I’m more confused than ever about which side to back.

by azibuck on Jun 17, 2011 5:06 PM EDT reply actions

Is this a Charlie Sheen in Platoon moment?

by MDBuc on Jun 17, 2011 5:58 PM EDT up reply actions

But Vlad’s never wrong.

The statement that I am now making is incorrect.

by Vlad on Jun 17, 2011 7:10 PM EDT via mobile up reply actions

That makes two of us.

He even has me almost convinced.

by bucdaddy on Jun 17, 2011 7:29 PM EDT up reply actions

A follow-up

Just for the fun of it, I decided to take a little closer look at sacrifice hits (bunts).

Looking at the numbers at the top, we can see that AL teams as a league bunt about 45-50 percent as often as NL teams, though if we adjust for the fact the NL has two extra teams, it’s probably more like 50-55 percent. But let’s just say for the sake of general argument that AL teams bunt half as often as NL teams.

However, of course, AL teams seldom send a pitcher to the plate, except in road interleague games, and so AL managers seldom confront the textbook automatic bunt situations that NL managers do. So when an AL manager bunts, it must almost always purely be for strategic (or tactical, I’m still not sure I get the difference) reasons.

So I looked at all NL teams for this season to see how often the pitcher successfully sacrificed, to take the pitcher out of the NL equation. Now there will of course be some problems with looking strictly at the raw numbers. Some teams may TRY to bunt a lot more often than they succeed because their pitchers are just lousy bunters, stuff like that, which for my purposes I’m just going to ignore.

Turns out, almost all NL teams’ successful sacrifices came from pitchers more than half the time, and the ones that didn’t get half their SHs from pitchers came very close.

(As a side point, we think Hurdle bunts a lot, but he really doesn’t. He’s kind of in the middle of the pack)

Here are the raw numbers as of today. The first number is the total of sac hits by pitchers and the second number is the team total. And BTW, the total number of sac hits right now for the NL is 485 and the AL is 240, almost exactly half, though with two fewer teams:

Phillies: 18/31
Braves: 19/34
Mets: 21/28
Nats: 23/37
Fish: 19/34
Brews: 15/32
Cards: 17/36
Reds: 17/29
Buccos: 16/33
Cubs: 13/26
Disastros: 15/25
Giants: 17/29
Dbacks: 16/25
Rox: 24/36
McCourts: 13/25
Padres: 11/25

It appears pretty clear that when NL teams bunt, they do it with the pitcher well over half the time. What I think this means — and I’m sure some of you will correct me if my logic is flawed — is that once you throw out the pitchers’ numbers, AL managers actually bunt MORE often (though not a LOT more often, but still …) than NL managers for strategic/tactical reasons.

That look about right?

by bucdaddy on Jun 18, 2011 11:35 AM EDT reply actions